After shrinking to focus on cheap shopping, Snapdeal faces the task of becoming a viable company within this segment.
Despite its near-collapse, Snapdeal continues to trade. Having fallen out of the top tier of Indian e-commerce sites due to high spend, poor M&A and the rise of rivals, the site was forced into a liquidity position. After dropping out of sale talks with Flipkart in 2017, it has refocused on offering a range of cheaper goods.
It has thus been able to avoid total failure. However, the business continues to post an adjusted operating loss, even if its marketplace revenues rose in FY26. To piece together the story of Snapdeal, we need to consider each element separately: how it fell, how it avoided shutting down and how close it is to a sustainable profit model.
Rising to become a $6.5bn site
Originally started in 2010 as a digital ‘deals’ site, co-founders Kunal Bahl and Rohit Bansal pivoted Snapdeal to a third-party seller marketplace in 2012.
Following substantial external capital injection, the site grew rapidly. In Oct 2014, SoftBank pledged $627m to the business, which at that point boasted >25m registered consumers and ~50k merchant accounts. By 2016, the firm’s implied value stood at c.$6.5bn.
As well as adding further product verticals, the business also built out other supporting functions (e.g. payments, shipping) and made additional acquisitions. Despite these actions, the firm was unable to secure a lasting moat against key rivals.
Snapdeal’s fall
A combination of overspend and waning ability to compete saw Snapdeal slip further down the rankings.
By Apr 2016, the Economic Times noted that Amazon had surpassed Snapdeal in terms of order volume, and was in turn trailed by Flipkart. As the site sought to grow its consumer base, it was simultaneously falling to its peers.
Mint highlighted the extent of the firm’s burn, citing discounts, advertising, general expenditure and its payments arm Freecharge. The latter led to a significant ad-hoc brand spend of ₹200cr in Sep 2016. This period also saw tension between different shareholder parties regarding future capital raises, with some bids reportedly declined and an impasse reached at the Board level.
Clearly, the business required further investment. While discounting helped drive order volumes, there was no obvious pathway to self-fund subsequent rounds of growth to acquire new consumers, ship goods and extend the business.
Furthermore, the various acquisitions made had largely added little to the business and many were disposed of or impaired (Outlook Business). In sum, the firm had grown too widely and had yet to win a dominant foothold in any area.
On the back of insufficient follow-on finance, Snapdeal curtailed spend, witnessed reduced GMV, shed a number of employees and shut its B2B marketplace Shopo. It had reached a point where scaling the business had grown increasingly challenging, as competitors accelerated.
Failure of the Flipkart transaction
Amidst this backdrop, talks began to sell the business to Flipkart in 2017.
Per Reuters, the Snapdeal Board had accepted a scaled-down proposal of up to $950m, subject to acceptance from the remaining minority shareholders. Nevertheless, the founders wished to chart a separate course. Accordingly, on 31 July, the two companies ended their talks and Snapdeal confirmed it would proceed as a standalone entity.
Notably, this represented a significant step down on the prior year’s valuation. The decision to go it alone meant that Snapdeal would have to operate on a materially reduced footprint.
One such divestiture was the payments business. In Jul 2017, Axis Bank reached a deal to buy Freecharge for ₹385cr.
Focusing on a smaller addressable market
With the introduction of ‘Snapdeal 2.0’, the company took the decision to drop certain categories of goods from its offering, and double down on others.
Specifically, it gave up the smartphone and whitegoods segments, which together made up c.50-60% of its business. From then on, it focused primarily on clothing, home and general retail. A secondary benefit was the expected opportunity to grow its consumer base in lower-tier cities.
This came at a steep price to the P&L. As reported by Business Today, the firm’s operating revenue contracted from ₹1,158.9cr in FY16 to ₹436.1cr in FY18. Snapdeal therefore knowingly traded away size in pursuit of a more targeted offering.
Naturally, the costs of driving orders, facilitating reverse logistics and enabling lower-priced sales would continue to weigh on the business. The key question was whether focusing on a narrower set of consumers and associated SKUs would prove sufficient.
Profitability status
According to the business’s FY26 numbers, it has continued to see higher order volumes, albeit with a persistent operating deficit.
| Snapdeal (marketplace) | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | ₹249.9 cr | ₹293.7 cr |
| Net Merchandise Value | ₹869.6 cr | ₹1,093.1 cr |
| Units delivered | 19.91 m | 25.98 m |
| Custs transacting in calendar year | 10.43 m | 12.16 m |
| Adjusted EBITDA (loss) | ₹48.0 cr | ₹50.3 cr |
Data from AceVector’s 9/2026 IPO prospectus. Note that NMV relates to value of goods sold through the platform, i.e. distinct from the company’s revenue. Similarly, adjusted EBITDA is not equivalent to the firm’s bottom-line.
It is also important to note that AceVector’s results will be impacted by its other holdings, namely the Unicommerce technology platform and retailer Stellaro Brands. Per the prospectus, the combined entity posted a net loss of ₹45.5cr in FY26, reducing from ₹126.3cr. Again, however, this does not imply that Snapdeal’s marketplace arm is running profitably.
Indeed, the software unit generated ₹204.3cr and ₹41.3cr of adj. EBITDA in the year, offsetting some of the losses. That said, for the half-year to Sep 2026, AceVector’s aggregate net loss expanded to ~₹43cr vs. ₹22.5cr in the prior year.
Competing with Meesho
As noted above, by abandoning the upper end of the market, Snapdeal opened itself to rivalry from firms such as Meesho.
In FY26, Meesho recorded ~264m consumers and ₹41,560cr NMV. The corresponding values for Snapdeal were 12.16m and ₹1,093.1cr (per the respective firms). Of course, care needs to be taken over the comparability of these metrics.
Nonetheless, the message is clear: simply competing on price will be hard for Snapdeal to differentiate itself given the presence of the larger player.
To this end, the business has further sought to position itself as a destination for low-cost fashion. In its FY27 H1 earnings release, Snapdeal noted that fashion NMV grew 31% YoY, vs. a 10% increase in total NMV. It additionally stated that the number of annual transacting customers exceeded 13m.
If true, this implies a possible route to improving retention of consumers via the fashion vertical.
The final hurdle
AceVector listed on the BSE on 5 October 2026, trading initially at ₹28.30 before its issue price of ₹32. The stage is now set for the business to demonstrate that it can retain and convert shoppers to make repeat orders.
Management’s current plan focuses heavily on driving increased fashion sales and encouraging higher rates of repurchase. Provided this proves successful, Snapdeal should be in a position to continue as a healthy marketplace.


